Russia Reflexive Control and the Subtle Art of Red Teaming

During the 1980s Tom Clancy gained fame writing techno-thrillers, situated in a fictional earth, using contemporary Common cold State of war-themes. His novels, amongst others, contributed to reviving attending to the concept of Maskirovka (Russian military deception). Particularly in Ruddy Storm Ascension, the  concept was extensively used within a political/strategic context. More than twenty years later, Maskirovka and other Soviet/Russian concepts are once over again relevant - as the Russia is applying them in various theatres - bordering NATO territory. This article will focus on a more refined version of Maskirovska, called Reflexive Control Theory (RCT). The aim of this commodity is to provide an insight into the concept of RCT, its application in the past, present and hereafter and how information technology affects NATO and kingdom of the netherlands Armed forces.

Major C. Kamphuis BSc.*

'And the Maskirovka?'

'In two parts. The first is purely political, to piece of work against the United states. The second role,

immediately earlier the war begins, is from KGB. You lot know it, from KGB Grouping Nord. We

reviewed it two years ago.'

Tom Clancy, Reddish Storm Rising (1986) p. 18

First of all, the article explores the concept of Maskirovka as a broader foundation for the application of Reflexive Control (RC). Secondly, the concept of RC will be discussed and put into a historical context. This will be followed by a review of recent and ongoing applications of RC in eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. The article concludes with a clarification of how RC could be - and is already - being applied in the Baltics, with a focus on the implications for (Dutch) NATO 'enhanced Forward Presence' (eFP) units operating in the Baltics.

Lithuanian President Grybauskaite, Prime Minister Rutte and former Commander in Main Middendorp visit Dutch troops deployed in NATO'due south enhanced Frontwards Presence, 2017. Photo Office of the President of the Republic of lithuania, R. Dackus

All original literature on RCT is written in Russian, a language which the writer does not master. Therefore, the literature written report has been conducted using Dutch and English publications. Timothy Thomas, an American analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, has published several all-encompassing studies over the past decades. He based them on the original works of Vladimir Lefebvre and other Russian pioneers of RCT. Therefore, the works of Thomas have been used in this study every bit a replacement for the original Russian publications.

The concept of Maskirovka explained

Maskirovka is a Russian concept predating the Soviet Matrimony, with the first official Maskirovka school being established in 1904.[1] Maskirovka is a concept encompassing multiple elements, such as camouflage, concealment, deception, misinformation, imitation, secrecy, security, feints, and diversion. The noun Maskirovka used to be translated equally 'to mask'. Showtime of all, this does not cover the concept at all, and furthermore information technology is really impossible to translate a noun as a verb.[2]

In the past, but too equally we speak, this prevented actors from affectionate the total extent of the concept and falsely mistake it for camouflage and concealment. In 2014, while writing about the conflict erupting in the Ukraine, announcer Oestron Moeler divers Maskirovka as deliberately misleading the opponent with regard to 1's ain intentions, causing the opponent to brand wrong decisions and thereby playing into one's ain hand.[3] This definition of Maskirovka is astoundingly similar to mod-day definitions of RC. This is not a coincidence: the concepts of Maskirovka and RC take a lot in mutual. Moreover, RC tin can be regarded as a refinement of Maskirovka.[4] Deception is a core element of both Maskirovka and RC. In order to effectively deceive an opponent, information technology is adamant that whatsoever is undertaken must appear highly plausible to the enemy, and it needs to arrange to both his perspective of Russian doctrine and to his ain strategic assumptions.[5]

Reflexive Command

Origins of RC

RC is a concept that was pioneered  in the Soviet Spousal relationship in the 1960s past Vladimir Lefebvre, a psychologist and mathematician, who is considered the founding father of this concept. RC is a special kind of influence action, and it predates the modern concept of information warfare. It was not until the late 1970s that this concept was formally adopted by the Soviet military machine, although Soviet war machine thinkers were already interested in the concept near a decade before. During the time that RC was not mentioned in whatever Soviet military handbook. Information technology did not officially be and thus could non exist mentioned in whatever military publication. Officers publishing in relevant Soviet war machine journals, such equally Voennaya mysl (Military Thought), wrote nigh 'control of the enemy' to circumvent this outcome.

Definitions of RC

RC is divers past Lefebvre as 'a procedure by which i enemy transmits the reasons or bases for making decisions to another', or equally he put it in the title of one his books, 'a Soviet concept of influencing an adversary'southward decision-making process'.[six] Timothy Thomas defines it every bit 'a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make predetermined decision desired past the initiator of the activeness'.[7] The core concept in these definitions is that an actor provides specific and predetermined information to another actor, with the explicit goal to command the decisions made by the receiver. In other words, controlling the controlling procedure leading to the receiving actor making decisions that will atomic number 82 to his defeat and/or enable the desired outcome for the transmitting actor.

Keir Giles, researcher at the NATO Defence College, mentioned that in Russian sources the phrase 'Reflexive Control' is no longer a current phrase. It has been partially replaced by the phrase 'Perception Management'. The latter phrase appears to have been adopted directly from western literature on Information Operations.[8] This notion contradicts statements made by Thomas in two different studies from 2004 and 2017. Thomas explicitly states that RC differs from any known western concept, because it is about controlling perception, and non about managing perception. Managing perception, and non controlling perception is the essence of western perception management within the context of information warfare.[nine] Because the Soviet/Russian concept of RC predates western thinking on information operations, information technology is likely that Thomas's conclusion is right. Therefore, in this commodity RC is considered every bit a different concept than perception management.

Effigy 1 Graph of the Gerasimov doctrine (Source: Charles Chiliad. Bartles, 'Getting Gerasimov Correct', in: Military Review, January-February  2016, p. 35. Reprinted with permission)

RCT in modern day Russian doctrine

Russian commanders in warfare have to apply RC, because one of the prime goals is to interfere with the controlling process of an enemy commander. Therefore, Russia considers RC at least as important every bit conventional firepower or fifty-fifty as a more decisive cistron.[10] It is an essential function of the modern Russian operational art, as described in the so-chosen Gerasimov Doctrine. This framework was published in February 2014 past General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed services (RFAF). This doctrine can be used as a planning tool for the RFAF to apply military and non-war machine means to influence all actors in order to achieve its goals. The doctrine describes six distinct phases in which a conflict develops from a concealed origin up to restoration of peace.[11]

According to General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian federation Military (RFAF), RC is at least as important as conventional firepower. Photo U.S. Department of Defense, Chiliad. Cullen

Gerasimov himself claimed that his doctrine is not a description of Russian doctrine at all. Instead it is a description of what the Due west (and especially the USA) has done in the last decades in diverse conflict areas, such every bit Iraq and Afghanistan. This claim is in fact supported by various thinkers within the western strategic community. They claim that recent Russian publications on modern warfare are merely an attempt to catch upwards conceptually with the reality of mod warfare, with which the West has already been grappling for near 2 decades.[12] Taking this into account, it may well be that Gerasimov actually did describe what he had observed in Iraq and Afghanistan, simply with the purpose to adopt this inside the framework of modern-24-hour interval Russian military thinking.

Hybrid Warfare

The western earth, especially NATO, categorizes current Russian military activeness as Hybrid Warfare. In Russian literature Hybrid Warfare is no longer a valid term. Instead, 'not-linear warfare' is used, and more recently 'New Type Warfare', to draw nowadays-day military activity.[13] I will continue to use the term Hybrid Warfare, because this is in line with all relevant contemporary western publications. Frank Hoffman defined Hybrid Warfare as a fusion of state of war forms that blur regular and irregular warfare. Gerasimov states the following in this regard: 'The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures (…) practical in coordination with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of concealed graphic symbol, including carrying out actions of informational disharmonize and the actions of special operations forces.'

According to contempo NATO studies, this renewed armed forces thinking is based upon Soviet legacy theories, such every bit Soviet Deep Operation Theory (DOT) and RC. In Soviet times, DOT originally focused on launching Special Forces, and specifically designed Operational Maneuver Groups, literally deep into the enemy rear. Nowadays, the physical component has been (largely) replaced by achieving furnishings in the enemy rear using more subtle techniques, such as RC.[14]

Mechanisms behind the concept of RC

The 'reflex' within RC involves the specific process of imitating the enemy's reasoning and crusade him to make a decision unfavourable to himself. And so, the reflex is not the reaction of the opponent an histrion seeks to create, just it is the ability of an histrion to imitate the opponent's thoughts or predict his behaviour. A receiver will brand a conclusion based on the idea of the situation which he has formed. This idea is formed by a set of concepts, knowledge, insights, ideas and experience of the receiver. This prepare is called the 'filter' within RC. The filter assists in separating necessary from useless information. The chief job of RC is, therefore, to find the weak link in the filter and exploit it. By exploiting this weak link an role player can create model behaviour in the system of the opponent he seeks to control.[15]

The aforementioned filter does not just include humans. In the modern age, automated information-processing systems composed of a significant role of decision-making processes, are part of the filter. Therefore, RC likewise includes digital data and is applied in the cyber domain. Methods to accomplish RC are varied and include camouflage, disinformation, encouragement, bribery by force and compromising officials and officers. Information technology is considered to exist more of a military fine art than a military science.[16]

How to apply RCT

In society to achieve a higher degree of reflex than the opponent, it is insufficient just to sympathize the opponent and his filter. One must also be capable of achieving surprise and act far more differently from what the opponent expects. Surprise and unforeseen behaviour can exist achieved past ways of stealth, disinformation and, nearly important, avoidance of stereotypes.[17] This appears to be paradoxical, considering part of RC is to reinforce the stereotypes an opponent has of his enemy and to convince him that that enemy volition exercise what he thinks is the almost logical option for him. But, somewhen all information technology takes is to surprise the opponent by doing something which is indeed unpredictable and defies the (reinforced) stereotypes.

It would be a grave misunderstanding to think that Russian commanders are anticipated, but because the Russian army is known to operate past using sets of predetermined tactics and procedures. The wide palette of bachelor tactics and procedures offers a commander enough options to devise operations which are intricate enough to deceive his opponent. The contempo improvements in C3I within the armed forces as well offer better means to orchestrate the execution of these intricate plans.[18]

Major General (retired) Ivonov published a checklist for commanders that gives a practical insight into how Russian commanders tin can apply RC:

• Ability pressure: using a superior force, threats of sanctions, raising the alert condition of troops, combat reconnaissance, weapon tests, supporting subservice elements destabilizing the enemies rear, playing upwardly victories and show mercy to an enemy ally that has stopped fighting.
• Measures to present false data about the state of affairs: concealment (display weakness in a strong place), creation of mock installations, concealing true relations between units (or create mock ones), maintain secrecy about new weapons, weapons backbiting, deliberately losing critical documents (some real, some imitation), subversion, leaving open a road to escape encirclement and forcing the enemy to take retaliatory actions involving expenditure of forces, avails and time.
• Influencing the enemy'southward controlling algorithm: systematic conduct exercises/demonstrations in accord with what the enemy already perceives as being routine modus operandi, publishing a deliberate distorted doctrine, striking enemy C2 and key figures and transmitting false groundwork data.
• Altering the decision-making time: unexpectedly start gainsay operations, transmitting data about the background of an analogous conflict to reinforce the enemy's assumptions and let him make hasty decisions that alter the mode of his operation.[19]

Basic elements of RC

Colonel S.A. Komov, an influential writer about RC in the 1990s, made the following list of basic elements of RC:

• Distraction: create a real or imaginary threat to the enemy's flank or rear during the preparatory stages of combat operations, forcing him to accommodate his plans.
• Overload (of data): often sent large amounts of conflicting data.
• Paralysis: create the perception of an unexpected threat to a vital involvement or weak spot.
• Exhaustion: compel the enemy to undertake useless operations, forcing him to enter combat with reduced resources.
• Deception: force the enemy to relocate avails in reaction to an imaginary threat during the preparatory stages of combat.
• Division: convince actors to operate in opposition to coalition interests.
• Pacification: convince the enemy that pre-planned operational training is occurring rather that preparations for combat operations.
• Deterrence: create the perception of superiority.
• Provocation: strength the enemy to take activeness advantageous to one's own side.
• Suggestion: offering data that affects the enemy legally, morally, ideologically, or in other areas.
• Pressure: offering data that discredits the enemy's commanders and/or regime in the optics of the population.[20]

The literature does not provide a conclusive reply, whether the elements described in the 2 lists above have to exist addressed equally a complete packet or whether a commander can option specific elements in order to exist constructive in achieving his goal. Many elements, nonetheless, appear to be interlinked. Some elements even appear to be the outcome of the implementation of other elements. As an example, applying overload and paralysis can contribute to achieving exhaustion, just every bit deception can. It tin can therefore be concluded that in order to be successful, all elements have to addressed, but to different degrees. It depends on the precise situation how important a specific chemical element is to achieve success. Furthermore, the different elements offer a commander the pick to modify the focus of his operation. If a sure element is non effective (or even counterproductivity) information technology is possible to increase the focus on another element to improve the chances of being successful somewhen.

RC in relation to the maneuvrist approach

In Dutch armed forces doctrine, fighting power is composed of a physical, mental and conceptual component. The aim of the maneuvrist approach is to defeat an opponent by breaking his moral and physical cohesion, instead of destroying him pace by stride (attrition). The maneuvrist approach emphasizes the need to sympathize and attack the conceptual and mental component of an opponent, besides attacking the concrete component.[21]

While looking at the concept of RC, information technology can be argued that this concept is in fact a Russian incarnation of the maneuvrist approach, with a great accent on attacking the conceptual component of an antagonist. In order to be effective in applying RC one must understand the opponent, which enables one to provide him with information which not merely reinforces his assumptions, merely also his natural way of reasoning. This inclines him to brand decisions that volition contribute to his own defeat. Combined with practical guidelines as formulated in the previous paragraph, RC offers an excellent manual to apply the maneuvrist arroyo in a pure form: out-maneuver the opponent mentally and conceptually (preferably) before or without engaging him physically. This might be a coincidence, simply it is likely an indicator of the integration of (successful) western doctrine in a pre-existing Russian concept.

Past application of RC: ii historical examples

In the past the Russian military and security forces actively practical the concepts of RC. The kickoff example is from the Cold War, when the Soviet Union tried to change the US perception of the nuclear balance. The goal was to convince the West that Soviet missile capabilities were far more formidable than they really were. To achieve this, they, amongst others, exhibited faux ICBMs at military parades in club to create the illusion that a single missile could bear huge multiple warheads.[22]

Forward to the victory of communism': in the Cold War the Soviet Union tried to mislead the West also during war machine parades. Photo Nationaal Archief/Collectie Spaarnestad/UPI

At the aforementioned time Soviet authorities made sure that armed forces attachés and known western intelligence officers would discover the parades closely. They further created a trail of collateral proof that western intelligence services would find when investigating the fake ICBMs, which would lead them even farther astray.[23] The ultimate goal was to atomic number 82 strange scientists, who would endeavor to copy the advanced technology, downwardly a expressionless-end street. Past doing and then, the West would exist wasting precious time, coin and scientific research capacity.[24]

The second example occurred during the occupation of the Russian White Business firm in October 1993 conducted past Members of Parliament and their supporters, advocating a return to communism. On the day of a massive demonstration by supporters of the occupation, the police permitted ane of its advice posts to be overrun by protesters, giving them access to secured communication channels. At the same time, the war machine authorities broadcasted deceptive messages, which could exist received by the protesters. The messages contained a false conversation of ii loftier-ranking officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), discussing the imminent storming of the White Business firm. They specifically mentioned aiming for 'the Chechen'. One of the key persons orchestrating the occupation was Ruslan Khasbulatov, the Speaker of Parliament who was of Chechen ethnicity. Within minutes of broadcasting the fake messages, Khasbulatov and other key figures appeared on the balcony of the White House and asked the crowd of supporters exterior to go to the Ostankino TV station and capture it. This public telephone call for disobedience was exactly what the security forces had aimed for. At present they could legally act against the key figures and cease the occupation.[25]

Mod day application of RC

The Crimea

On March xviii, 2014, Russian federation annexed Crimea communicable almost everybody off baby-sit including the Ukrainian government and security apparatus, but likewise many decision-makers within NATO. The Russian Armed services disguised its actions and strongly denied involvement. The best-known example of this are the infamous 'footling light-green men' who popped up everywhere. Defective any unit insignia or other features that could link them to Russian federation made it possible for the Russian government to deny the merits they were in fact Russian Special Forces.[26] These actions can hands be categorized as a classical instance of Russian military machine deception, or Maskirovka, but are they besides prove of the use of the more than refined concept of RC? To answer this, the following question must exist answered starting time: did the Russian Federation influence (use its ability to reflex and manipulate the filter of) Ukrainian and western governments with the intention to allow them make the determination non to take activeness and thus exercise exactly what the Russians wanted them to do? It is argued that Russia manipulated Kiev's and NATO'south sensory awareness of the outside world in the period leading up to the bodily annexation of the Crimea.

The overall goal was non to paralyze their systems, simply to modify their perception of reality by disguising the Kremlin's existent intentions (annexation of the Crimea). Kiev and NATO had to come to the conclusion that Russia would not invade the Crimea and that de-escalation was the all-time option, which was exactly what the Kremlin intended. This was achieved in various ways. First of all, Russian forces already present in Crimean naval bases were capable of seizing central points under the cover of deception. They also penetrated deeply and paralyzed a possible Ukrainian response (for case, past holding Ukrainian forces hostage within their own billet). Russian military build-upwardly along the eastern Ukrainian edge, preceding the eventual annexation, was another factor. This did non only pin down Ukrainian units in those areas at a huge altitude from the Crimea, but information technology as well added to the defoliation in Kiev and within NATO about the truthful scope and intentions of the Kremlin. The massive armed forces build-up and sub-sequential snap-exercises[27] did not only add to confusion, but also deterred Kiev from taking whatsoever decisive action in the Crimea. [28] The afore-mentioned combination of Russian actions leads to the conclusion that RC was indeed applied regarding the annexation of the Crimea.

The success of the Russian Crimean campaign was astounding. In a affair of iii weeks, and without a shot being fired, the morale of the Ukrainian military machine was cleaved and Ukraine surrendered all of its 190 military bases in the Crimea. This was accomplished by less than x,000 Russian troops (mostly naval infantry, and some airborne and Spetsnaz battalions) making use of the BTR-80 armoured personnel carrier equally their heaviest gainsay vehicle. The Ukrainian forces totaled 16,000 and included mechanized formations with armoured infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery and tanks.[29]

Eastern Ukraine

The ongoing disharmonize in eastern Ukraine may also serve every bit an example of the awarding of RC inside the context of hybrid warfare. The massive build-upwardly of Russian forces that started back in 2014 forth the Russian-Ukrainian border is still in that location, disguising the sending of troops beyond the edge or providing weapons to separatists. It also offers a disguise for Russian forces operating from Russian soil, for example the launching of Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems (RPAS), arms strikes in the Ukraine, or Electronic Warfare units jamming frequencies of Ukrainian units all originate from Russian soil.

People climb a Russian tank in Kiev during the opening of an exhibition of Russian weapons captured from pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine. Publicly the Kremlin denies whatsoever involvement in the region. Photo ANP/AFP, Southward. Supinski

Publicly the Kremlin denies any involvement in eastern Ukraine, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. The evidence includes specific versions of fighting vehicles operating in eastern Ukraine which are exclusively used by Russian forces. Information technology also includes pictures of damaged Russian tanks, which accept sustained damage that can only be inflicted in bodily gainsay due to mines, anti-tank missiles and other tanks. These pictures have been taken on Russian territory, when the tanks were being repaired within several kilometres from the Ukrainian border.

Disinformation targets public perception

At that place is likewise a large ongoing campaign using disinformation, which not but targets the population of the Ukraine and Crimea, but also the public in Russia itself. A recent publication from NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCOM CoE) reports that the deception campaign is highly successful, stating that only 6 per cent of Russians believe that the war in eastern Ukraine continues due to the interference of the Russian leadership in the conflict past supporting the Donetsk People'southward Republic and Luhansk People'south Republic.[30] However, what is more relevant for this article is that the disinformation too targets western and Ukrainian public perception, based on a specific strategic narrative which likewise has the purpose to split up the West. Russian federation makes use of dissimilar and sometimes alien economic interests of European union member-states regarding Russian federation. It also exploits the difference in views between New Europe (Eastern Europe) and Old Europe (Western Europe). Furthermore, Russian federation exploits celebrated paradigms, such every bit the Nazi occupation many countries endured during World War II. This is also the reason why at that place is such a strong emphasis on branding pro-Kiev movements as fascist and linking them to a fascist-friendly authorities in Kiev.[31]

The following narratives are existence used to target the West, the Ukraine and Russian society:

• Indigenous Russian minorities are suppressed in the Ukraine and in EU-countries;
• Russian federation is an enemy of the W and therefore the West tries to limit Russian federation'south global influence and ability;
• The USA and other European union-countries organized the colour revolutions in a few post-Soviet countries that were anti-Russian federation oriented;
• Russia is a superpower and has to have the right to influence. The 'objective' sphere of its influence is the Commonwealth of Contained States (CIS);
• Russia is a stronghold in fighting modern fascism. Everything identified as anti-Soviet or anti-Russian should be labelled every bit fascism;
• The western individualism is destructive. Collective consciousness is the traditional form of consciousness for Russians;
• The Russian Orthodox Church building is the only right religion. Morality is dying in the W. Europe becomes 'Gay-Europe', which is illustrated by the many homophobic rants in Russian media and society;[32]
• The Russian World, the Russkiy Mir, is an alternative to 'Gay-Europe'.[33]

The Russian Federation has several strategic objectives including preventing further expansion to the east by both NATO and the EU, and recreating a buffer zone between the Russian heartland and NATO. Until now Russia has succeeded in avoiding a strong and decisive activeness by either NATO or the Ukrainian military in eastern Ukraine and thereby contributed to the aforementioned two objectives.[34]

Awarding of RC in the Baltics

The conflict in Ukraine is taking identify at the fringes of EU and NATO territory. Russian federation, all the same, is also being perceived as a threat to the NATO member states in the Baltics, Estonia, Republic of latvia and Lithuania. Russian federation's aggressive stance includes attempts to actuate Russian proxies (Russian ethnic minorities), simulated attacks by SU-24 fighters in the Baltic Bounding main on United states navy vessels, cyberattacks, and threats to apply nuclear weapons. The threat is being perceived as existent in these states, especially in Estonia and Lithuania.

It is interesting to notice that, although there are large Russian-speaking minorities in all three states, they do differ in nature from the Russian minority in eastern Ukraine. For example, at that place is inappreciably any desire to join the Russian motherland amongst the Russian- speaking minorities. In fact, many of them consider President Putin an opportunist and they prefer to stay in the Baltics and be part of the EU and NATO. The biggest threat to the Baltics, therefore, comes from the always-increasing numbers of Russian forces surrounding them. The threat lies not only in the numbers, but also in the quality of equipment of these units. The perceived threat already led to an Enhanced Forward Presence of NATO battlegroups.[35] Marcel van Herpen, director of the Cicero Foundation, says that Russian behaviour towards the Baltics fits within the framework of RC. He states that, just equally is the example with the Ukraine, Russia attempts to redraw the map of Europe and reinstate a buffer zone between the 'motherland' and NATO past influencing decision-making processes in the Baltics and NATO.[36] A possible scenario which Russian federation hopes to achieve is to make NATO members inclined to think that de-escalation is the best selection, which in fact would requite the Baltic States the feeling they are being abandoned and will thus divide NATO.[37] It is fifty-fifty suggested that Russian federation volition somewhen invade the Baltics in Blitzkrieg fashion and, past deterring NATO, aim at slowing downwards a decisive response allowing Russia enough fourth dimension to create an advantageous negotiating position.[38]

Government minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov addresses international security matters during a visit to NATO's headquarters. Photo NATO

RC and eFP

The Royal Netherlands Regular army also participates in NATO'southward enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), inside the German-led multi-national battlegroup in Lithuania. Well-nigh countries participating in the eFP battlegroups have imposed restrictions on their contingents, in some cases including the brake to stay in barracks except during organized tours.[39] The measures are largely a reaction to Russian data operations, discrediting NATO presence in the Baltic region and eastern Europe at every possible opportunity. Incidents involving NATO service members are, of course, exploited to the full extent past Russian media outlets like RT and Sputnik.[40] The Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltics largely depend on Russian-based news outlets and are like shooting fish in a barrel targets for the Kremlin. But also, other western news outlets have a tendency to re-create the Russian narrative, permit lone social media where fake news narratives can go viral in an instant.[41]

Thus, it seems quite a sensible measure at start sight to avert whatever chance of unwanted media coverage of misbehaving soldiers. A recent incident in August 2017, concerning intoxicated Dutch soldiers in Republic of lithuania, is an instance of what NATO wants to avoid.[42] Minimizing any risk of unwanted incidents tin relatively easily be accomplished by restricting freedom of movement of personnel, for instance past putting into effect a curfew, etc. However, by restricting the movement and visibility of personnel, NATO contingents are perchance more or less alienating their units from their environment. This development, in turn, might brand it easier for Russian federation to continue its relentless stream of negative coverage regarding NATO in the very same countries, because people take a tendency to fear or distrust anyone they practise not know. Furthermore, it is a fact that several negative stories near NATO contingents in the Baltics were completely made upwardly, and could exist categorized as fake news. I recent example concerns the High german battlegroup commander in Lithuania beingness photographed with a Russian 'spy' in the Ruddy Square in Moscow; another the alleged rape of a immature girl by ii German language servicemen.[43]

Restricting the liberty of movement of NATO service members does non at all preclude the Russian government from releasing imitation stories nigh misconduct. Alienating NATO contingents from their environs by imposing restrictions on freedom of movement could be exactly the outcome Russia has been aiming for all the fourth dimension. Then, information technology is possible NATO itself is unwillingly creating a new example of successful Russian implementation of RC against the alliance for historians to reflect upon later on.

Conclusion

The aim of this article is to provide an insight into the concept of RCT, its application in the by, present and hereafter and how it furnishings NATO and the Netherlands Armed Forces. RC essentially influences an adversary's conclusion-making process with specifically prepared information and induce him to make decisions that are in fact predetermined by the originator of the prepared information. Over more than a half-century the concept has been used often. During the Common cold War information technology was used by the Soviet Union to influence NATO and the United states of america in the nuclear arms race, while in the early 90s Russia used it also to target Russian civilians and politicians to prevent a coup d'état. In the recent past RC has been used by the Russian federation within the framework of hybrid warfare, for example in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine. There is also evidence of the apply of RC in the Baltic region at this very moment.

Application of RC in the Ukraine and the Baltics likely serves a mutual goal: redrawing the maps of Europe and creating a more favourable situation for the Russia, recreating (in some manner) a strategic buffer between the Russian heartland and NATO. In the Baltics efforts are fabricated to ignominy NATO equally an alliance and NATO troop contributions specifically as part of a bigger plan to influence decision-making within the Baltics and NATO.

Implications for kingdom of the netherlands Armed Forces and NATO

RC, although a Russian concept, appears to be of great relevance apropos the (Dutch) doctrinal basics regarding the maneuvrist approach. It is therefore recommended that the Dutch military machine, in a broader framework of NATO, look into applying the mechanisms of RC itself to target the conceptual and mental component of opponents. In order to be able to do this, the Netherlands Military starting time have to get a real agreement of its possible opponents and acquire to permit go of western paradigms (this without implying that the terminate justifies all ways). In order to begin to empathise an adversary, information technology is relatively piece of cake to offset reading open up source publications on for case military doctrine. A note of caution in this regard, nevertheless, was given by the Russian General A.F. Klimenko in 1997, claiming that the Russian Federation put false information into official armed forces doctrine, with the purpose of exploiting the carefully cultivated misconceptions by applying RC at the appropriate fourth dimension.

Regarding the application of RC in the Baltics, NATO has to look into ways to counter RC applied by the Russian Federation. This includes amongst others countering negative narratives from Russian media outlets past providing NATO's narrative. On the other hand, showing to the public that eFP service members who misbehave are getting punished is mayhap more effective in this regard than trying to avoid whatsoever chance at an incident. If kingdom of the netherlands and other NATO members want to avoid being deceived by the mechanics of RC, they will kickoff have to understand themselves and especially how they are assessed by the Russian Federation. If they are able to see themselves through the same glasses equally the institutions that target them by using RC, they volition be amend able to identify possible threats. Furthermore, it is essential to be critical every fourth dimension a decision is fabricated that seems to be the just logical option, because RC preys on logical reasoning.

While reading this article, we could become paranoid because information technology appears that we cannot even trust one'due south own logical reasoning anymore. The harsh reality is that one must indeed question 1's own decisions to avoid being manipulated within the context of RC. It would be wise to enquire oneself over and over again the question with an historical ring regarding the outcome of decisions to be made: cui bono?

* Christian Kamphuis is a major in the Regal Netherlands Army and is currently working at the Land Training Center, office of the Didactics and Training Command. This commodity was written every bit a spin-off from the doctrinal bulletin on the Russian Contained Motor Rifle Brigade, which the author wrote on behalf of Commander Land Training Center.

[1] H. Bouwmeester, Behold: Let the Truth Be Told—Russian Charade Warfare in the Crimea

and Ukraine and the Return of 'Maskirovka' and 'Reflexive Control Theory', in: Ducheine, P., Osinga, F., NL Artillery 201, Winning Without Killing: The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises, Den Haag: T.Thou.C. Asser Press (2017) 125-155.

[2] H. Bouwmeester (2017).

[3] H. Bouwmeester (2017).

[4] H. Bouwmeester (2017).

[5] T.L. Thomas, 'Russian federation'due south Reflexive Control Theory and The Armed services', in: Periodical of Slavic Military machine Studies 17 (2004) 237–256.

[half-dozen] V.A. Lefebvre, op cit in: Shemayev, V.N., 'Reflexive command in socio-economic systems', in: Information & Security. An international Journal No. 22(2007) 28-32.

[7] T.L. Thomas, 'Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and The Armed services', in: Journal of Slavic Armed forces Studies V7 (2004) 237–256.

[8] Giles, K., Handbook of Russian Data Warfare, Rome: NATO Defence force College (2016) 19.

[nine] Thomas, T.L., Kremlin Kontrol, Ft Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office (2017) 175-197.

[10] V. Shemayev (2007).

[11] T. Selhorst, 'Russia's Preception Warfare', in: Militaire Spectator 185 (4) (2016) 148-164.

[12] C. Kasapoglu, Russia's renewed armed services thinking: non-linear warfare and reflexive control, Rome: NATO Defence College (2015).

[thirteen] T. Thomas, The Evolving Nature of Russian federation's Manner of War, in: Military Review, July-August 2017.

[14] C. Kasapoglu (2015).

[15] T. Thomas (2017) 175-197.

[16] V. Shemayev (2007).

[17] T.Fifty. Thomas, 'Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and The Armed forces', in: Periodical of Slavic Armed forces Studies 17 (2004) 243.

[18] L.W. Grau, How Russia Fights, Ft Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military machine Studies Office (2016) 50-51.

[19] T.L. Thomas, 'Russian federation's Reflexive Control Theory and The Military', in: Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004) 243-246.

[20] T.50. Thomas, 'Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and The Military', in: Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004) 248-249.

[21] Doctrine Publicaties 3.2, Landoperaties. Amersfoort: Land Warfare Centre (2014) 81-89.

[22] T.L. Thomas, 'Russia'south Reflexive Control Theory and The Military', in: Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004) 252-253.

[23] A. Baranov, 'Parade of Fakes, Moskovskii komsomolets (Moscow Komsomol), May 8, 1999, 6, as translated and entered on the FBIS webpage, May eleven, 1999.

[24] Run across http://www.contained.co.uk/news/moscow-paraded-dummy-missiles-1185682.....

[25] Run across https://www.rferl.org/a/russian federation-players-1993-crisis/25125000.html.

[26] The United states Regular army Special Operations Command, Piffling Light-green Men, Carolina: The U.s.a. Army Special Operations Control (2016)  21-twoscore.

[27] A snap-practice includes units beingness deployed without any prior alert given, to test their operational readiness in instance of emergency. Sometimes units only accept to move to an associates expanse, but sometimes they have to participate in in exercises after arriving at the associates area.

[28] T. Bukkvol, Russian Special Operations Forces in Donbass and Crimea, Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Institution (2016).

[29] C. Kasapoglu (2015).

[30] Five. Ogrisko, Russian information and propaganda war:some methods and forms to counterreact, Riga: NATO Stratcom CoE (2016).

[31] J. Bērziņš et al, Assay of Russia's Information Entrada against Ukraine. Riga: NATO StratCom Center of Excellence (2015).

[32] J. Rutenberg,  'RT, Sputnik and Russia's New Theory of State of war', in: New York Times Mag, 13 September 2017. Come across https://nyti.ms/2eUldrU.

[33] V. Ogrisko (2016).

[34] J. Bērziņš et al (2015).

[35] J.E. Noll, 'De Baltische Staten, de Russische minderheid en de verdediging van de NAVO', in: Militaire Spectator 186 (2017) (four) 169-183.

[36] See https://www.baltictimes.com/russia_s_nuclear_blackmail_and_new_threats_o....

[37] M.H. van Herpen, Russian federation'south nuclear threats and the security of the Baltic states (Maastricht: Cicero Foundation, 2016).

[38] Encounter http://www.fpri.org/2017/06/natos-baltic-defense-claiming/#.WT7tJoyh6fU....

[39] Run into http://www.nationalpost.com/chiliad/wp/news/canada/web log.html?b=news.nationalpo....

[40] Run into https://medium.com/dfrlab/russian-narratives-on-natos-deployment-616e19c....

[41] See https://jamestown.org/program/russian-fake-news-operation-seeks-generate....

[42] Come across https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nederland/nederlandse-militairen-weggestuurd-ui....

[43] Run into https://www.thelocal.de/20170217/german-army-battles-fake-news-campaign-....

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Source: https://www.militairespectator.nl/thema/strategie-operaties/artikel/reflexive-control

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